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1. I do seem (with Armah) to reject Big Time Teleology, only to replace it with
the story of “a society that is teleological at every point insofar as it is the result
of choice … suffusing every moment in the history of human society with its own
telos.” From unitary historical teleology to finite articulations of telos throughout
history; telos pluralized but telos all the same, a pluralistic teleology, so to speak.
Is my comrade exploiting the dual meanings of telos: telos as informing design and
telos as immanent goal or purpose? “The result of choice” may conceivably be called
telos in the first sense (I’d prefer to describe it as a constraining project (“project”
in the Sartrean sense) but probably not in the second?
2. Distinguishing between communism as capitalism’s consummation or patrimony
and communism as “the negation of capitalism”; or conversely put, capitalism
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as communism’s condition but not in the sense of being the latter’s determining
cause, still less its beneficent progenitor, but capitalism as the determinate, actually
existing socio-economic form, the damned thing, that must be dismantled as
a categorical imperative of the present time. A revised counter-Hegelian version
of “determinate negation”? Well taken argument.
3. That stipulation, then, changes communism from a well-nigh transhistorical
demand for egalitarian justice to being a specific alternative to a specific and known
entity, capitalism. By contrast I seem (with Armah) to retroactively turn this
determinate entity into an instantiation of the eternally recurring story of injustice,
and this specific alternative that is communism into an equally recurring demand,
albeit in variegated idioms, for justice—the denouement of an old story, or more
precisely, one more act in a perennial drama. Even if communism instantiates
the object of the desire for egalitarian justice, the specificity of this object is lost;
communism then becomes a possibility for all seasons. That fuzzy indeterminateness
is precisely what The German Ideology pillories, a point in fact briefly address in the
Postscript. Again, the argument is well taken
4. I seem (with Armah) to be saying or implying this and that. It is evident from
Collins’s piece that it’s not always clear in my third chapter where Armah is speaking
unedited and where I am doing the talking. Clearly, there is some confusing fusion of
voices here. But Ayi Kwei’s Marx (and picture of Marxism in general) and mine are
not clones. From “Masks and Marx” to his latest book The Way of Companions
Armah’s view of Marx and Marxism as nothing more than just another unexpurgated
version of white racist, Eurocentric mythology and its procrustean philosophy
of history is not how I see the matter. Perhaps the chapter does not make this
clear enough. In retrospect, the problem is my exegetical method, which is partly
indebted to political philosopher Isaiah Berlin (Oyeleye will probably not be amused
by this—see below). Berlin famously conveyed the ideas of thinkers in a manner so
compelling that you, the reader, are often at a loss to tell whether those views are
Berlin’s own or those of the thinker in question. This is especially true of views he
disagreed with but whose inspiration and motivation he understood, even sympa-
thized with (watch him describe the idea of “positive liberty,” a doctrine of freedom
he disliked and considered dangerous). Trust me, I am no Isaiah Berlin, but in a per-
verse sort of way, perhaps I succeeded only too well in making my voice indistin-
guishable from Armah’s. Concurring as I do with the overarching radical ethicism of
his argument for communism, I do not always flag discrete substantive points of
disagreement with his opposing, quite hostile view of Marx and the Marxist trad-
ition and his interpretation of that tradition’s account of the conditions of possibil-
ity for communism. Only in one place do I hint at a demurral, viz. Armah’s view
regarding the Western proletariat’s putative capacities and virtues as evidenced in
real history: “There is no doubt much to quarrel with …” I am persuaded by
Kevin Anderson’s refutation, in his magisterial Marx at the Margins, of the idea of
the determinist, unilinearist, irredeemably Eurocentric, even racist Marx. But per-
haps, comrade, a paper beckons—“Ayi Kwei’s Marx and Mine,” named after (here I
go again!) G.A. Cohen’s “Isaiah’s Marx and Mine,” in his Finding Oneself in
the Other.
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Kruger’s conundrum
1. I think Kruger overextends my thesis regarding a common inescapable “vernacular
Kantianism.” I don’t quite go so far as to say that “everybody who talks ethics is
talking the same language, whether they know it or not;” only that every justification
of a moral assertion and claim reposes on and ultimately resorts, to a universalizing
language—what Seyla Benhabib calls “justificatory universalism.”
2. Concerning Derrida and Foucault. Perhaps not much can be done with Derrida
in the metaethical matter of justification, the justification of ethical practice and
values, which, on Kruger’s reading, Derrida considers conceptually impossible.
The ethical is ethical precisely because it is ungroundable. Are you inclined to do the
right thing? Just do it, Derrida would seem be saying. That self-authorization without
grounds is not inconsequential. It can no doubt sponsor private, timely, contingent
acts of kindness, charity, hospitality, friendship, care. The shared and shareable work
of justice requires more—“an undeconstructable concern for justice,” as Simon Critchley
and Richard Kearney put it in their Preface to Derrida’s On Cosmopolitanism and
Forgiveness.
3. Foucault’s stance is a little trickier (it’s not for nothing that Charles Taylor
begins a well-known essay on him with the words “Foucault disconcerts.”); but it is
a stance that the foundationalist can work on or rather with. In what way? By asking
how the contingent impossibility of (justification-bound) ethical practice is knowable
and nameable as contingent, except by reference to a quasi-transcendental norm. Such
is the crypto-normativism of critical (as distinct from radical) historicism in moral
epistemology, one that discloses “the specific structure of power that enforces or
proposes” the ethical, and in so doing reveals the latter as a skewed universal. And
how is that possible without intimations of a truer and truly shareable version? Those
intimations are thinkable on the part power’s most violated subjects; they are the
substance of their murmurs and screams and dreams.
Oyeleye’s strictures
Oyeleye’s strictures form a cluster. Let me address the second in that cluster (the first,
alas, has to do with my prose), namely, “the preeminence of Kant, Marx, Hegel,
Rorty, Badiou, Nietzsche, and so many ‘Western’ or ‘Western-leaning’ ontological
and epistemological frameworks” and my “immense reliance on Western orthodoxy
to universalize African humanist thought”. This, in a work “that claims universalism
with Africa at the center.” First, the book is a conversation as much with Africans
as with leftists everywhere, but without a doubt principally leftists of “the West,”
narrowly construed. It places some central arguments in contemporary African
thought in dialogue with some key recurring and more recent leftist concepts and
debates. My hope is that non-Africans and non-Africanists, particularly those on the
left (perhaps even some curious non-leftists) will find something useful in the book,
say, re-examinations of their arguments and commitments in light of ideas and
debates within African intellectual history. To that end my text does indeed invoke a
host of Western thinkers—by no means all figures of “Western orthodoxy”—but it
does so not to “universalize African humanist thought” in the spirit of foreign aid,
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but rather to illustrate analogies among idioms of ethical thought. My argument
in fact is that African ethical thought has no need to be universalized; it is already
self-universalizing as an internal necessity. Mine is (simply) a reminder of our old
normal, a call to sankofa as metacritique issued to self-described opponents of univer-
salism who see it as something alien. It is in that spirit that I reference Riffaterre in
the last chapter. I tweak his yardstick for literariness by conveying the African literary
work’s “liberation not indeed from history but from a reductive historicism, not from
local particulars but from radical particularism.” I underscore “conveying” because
that liberation is not something I am recommending or prescribing to our writers but
something already at work in their texts. My stance is thus not one that “elevates” or
thinks to elevate African literature from an impoverishing provincialism, politicism
and historicism. Rather, it is one that seeks to make manifest how the African literary
work already attends to the universal-in-context. But perhaps even such a nuanced
context-conscious (albeit anti-anti-universalist) stance is not roots-reverencing
enough, insufficiently self-referential and tautological in its justificatory vocabulary
for nationalist relativists. I am afraid I will have to plead guilty. I will only ask: Will
nationalist relativists be able to agree on any shareable norms of validity, rightness and
beauty if they pushed their relativism all-the-way-down, down to intramural arguments
and internal adjudication of the true, the right and the beautiful? Aha, they will undoubt-
edly exclaim, there goes one of the usual suspects, comprador votary of Enlightenment
Reason? And this would be my retort: Why do we anti-imperialists—irony of ironies—
keep awarding exclusive ownership of a human practice, a demonstrably intracultural
and shared part of our discursive commons, to one fragment of humanity? So to return,
in conclusion, to the heavy presence of “Western” references in a text that professes to
be Africacentric, I would respond that there is no doubt a legitimate question of the right
balance to strike, but that, in principle, a fearless Africacentrism, one freed of reactive
phobias, is ready to raid all available arsenals of the human commons and shamelessly
conscript them for native necessities.
Babanovski’s clarifications
Babanovski is right regarding Sam Harris. I should have been far more probing
regarding the substantive consequences of Harris’s moral realism, the pernicious uses
to which he has come to put his species of formal universalism: uses that utterly
subvert its shareable substantive promise. I do in fact caution (invoking and inverting
Marx’s shell/kernel metaphor) that the formal shell of inescapable metaethical
universalism is no guarantee of a lovely kernel, and I left it at that (Left Universalism,
24-25, 32). I should have added: follow the kernel, smell its innards.
In a commentary replete with positive vibrations, I particularly appreciate
Babanovski’s concluding sentence: “Sekyi-Otu’s work impels literary critics to see
African literature as addressing more than the immediately local, national or even
regional concerns that gave cause to its specific content but as encompassing the
whole human world of shared scarcity and abundance.” That sentence provides an
answer to how Oyeleye’s “nationalist relativists” would read my view of what is to be
done with Riffaterre’s yardstick of literariness—ultimately, what is to be done with
JOURNAL OF THE AFRICAN LITERATURE ASSOCIATION 281





 2019 Ato Sekyi-Otu
https://doi.org/10.1080/21674736.2019.1594872
282 BOOK REVIEW SYMPOSIUM
